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ABSTRACT 
This article ponders the questions of why so many literary scholars 
want to bring literary and economic issues together now, and why it 
seems so difficult to establish a genuinely cross-disciplinary con-
versation.1 Offering two examples of approaches to the intersec-
tion of literary and economic issues that privilege methodology over 
themes, history, or theory—a very brief genealogy of the concept of 
a national economy and an equally brief analysis of derivatives—the 
article calls for an ongoing reflection on whether literary and cultural 
scholars have the right tools for the job and, conversely, the right job 
for our tools.
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Ever since the publication of Martha Woodmansee’s essay 
collection in 1999,2 many literary scholars have attempted to 
bring our work into some relation to economic issues. Some 
scholars have focused on economic themes in literary texts—
Silas Marner’s obsession with gold in George Eliot’s novel, for 
example, or Shakespeare’s depiction of Shylock in The Merchant 
of Venice. Others have highlighted the finances of publishing—the 
ways literary production belongs to a larger market society, or the 
profits that accrued to serial, as opposed to volume, publication 
in the nineteenth century. Some literary scholars have examined 
metaphors favored by both imaginative and economic writers—
credit, risk, and value come to mind. And still others have explored 
the extent to which the material media of economic transactions—
money, bills of exchange, double entry bookkeeping ledgers—
constitute forms of writing, which can be read as carefully as 
literary texts.
To see the big picture, we can group the range of literary-
economic investigations into several categories. I find it most 
useful to think in terms of thematic, historical, and theoretical 
approaches. This taxonomy, however, doesn’t say much about 
why so many literary scholars want to bring literary and economic 
issues together now, much less why it seems so difficult to 
establish a genuinely cross-disciplinary conversation (in which 
economists, not just other literary scholars, also participate). In 
this article, I want to begin with these fundamental questions: why 
is it so important now? Why is it so hard? Then, I will provide 
two examples of approaches to the intersection of literary and 
economic issues that privilege methodology over themes, history, 
or theory. What I can’t do—alas—is lure economists to the table. At 
the end of the article, I will suggest why the conversation between 
literary critics and economists may remain an elusive goal: the 
tools our respective disciplines have developed not only address 
different questions; they are also devised to meet different ends.
To address my first question—why do literary scholars want 
to address economic issues now—I’ll offer a sociological answer. 
In terms of the sociology of disciplines—the degree of relative 
social authority accorded various academic disciplines—the 
decades since the 1960s have witnessed two different trajectories 
for literary study and economic analysis. According to Michael 
Bernstein’s study of the economics profession, academic 
economists enjoyed relatively little prestige before the 1960s.3 
Policy-makers rarely consulted economists, and economists 
themselves remained deeply divided on basic matters like 
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methodology and whether—or to what extent—economists’ 
political commitments should inform their theories. In the United 
States, this situation had begun to change in the late 1940s with 
the creation of the Council of Economic Advisors, but the first two 
decades of this presidential advisory body were characterized by 
infighting among the advising economists and repeated charges 
that the economists’ supposedly objective recommendations were 
examples of thinly disguised ideological advocacy. As increasing 
numbers of academic economists began to embrace mathematical 
modeling in the 1960s and 1970s, however, dissent within their 
ranks was gradually replaced by a methodological consensus 
that pitted the majority of economists against a “heterodox” 
fringe. This had the predictable effect of enabling economists to 
present their theories, methods, and practices as a united front, 
even though squabbles among academics continued behind the 
scenes. Meanwhile, in governments across Europe and the US, 
economists also gained credibility and prestige. Government-
employed economists enhanced the reputation of their discipline 
through at least two routes: first, they created data-rich models 
that helped legislators repair war-ravaged economies after World 
War II (Jan Tinbergen, working in the Netherlands, comes to 
mind, as do Wassily Leontief, the Russian who developed input-
output models for the US economy, and John Maynard Keynes, the 
great British economist, who addressed the problem of Germany 
reparations); and second, particularly in the United States, the 
economists chosen to advise the President promoted politically 
popular growth models over the controversial cyclical models 
previous members of the Council of Economic Advisors had 
favored. Growth models in their modern form were introduced 
in 1962 by John F. Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisors. 
These models provided quantitative targets for the economy 
(so that success was easily defined in measurable terms); they 
advocated flexibility in tax policy (so that taxation could be 
shifted as political winds changed); they replaced the idea that 
unemployment is a structural problem with an argument about 
low aggregate demand (so that attention was redirected toward 
consumer demand); and they focused on the supply side of the 
economy (which, once more, enabled legislators to promote 
productivity and growth rather than inequality or stability). 
The policies that followed the theoretical shift from cyclical 
models and sustainability to growth models and supply side 
economics directed monies to technology, including space travel 
and, eventually, IT technologies; and they reduced corporate 
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taxation in the name of free enterprise and trickle-down theories 
that claimed that the distribution of wealth was a natural effect 
of enriching the wealthy. Many of the policies that helped neo-
liberalism gain a foothold after the creation of the Mont Pelerin 
Society in 1947 were supported by (and used to support) the growth 
models mainstream economists embraced from the 1960s on. 
Thus, while skeptics have raised probing questions about whether 
economists as a group merit the authority they now exercise—
especially in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis4—few 
observers of today’s disciplinary hierarchy would dispute that the 
“Queen of the Social Sciences” reigns supreme in universities and 
national capitals alike.
The sociological history of literary study has followed a 
different trajectory since the 1960s (and here my remarks have 
to be limited to the US.) Academic literary study had received a 
boost in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when soldiers 
returning to the US swelled the student numbers in colleges 
and universities; while the availability of textbooks designed 
to systematize the study of literature, such as Cleanth Brooks’ 
and Robert Penn Warren’s Understanding Poetry (1938) and 
Understanding Fiction (1943), simplified literary analysis and 
made majoring in English more attractive. The visibility of the 
discipline was further enhanced in the late 1960s and 1970s when 
American literary scholars began to embrace Continental theories 
about how language creates meaning. Writings by Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Julia Kristeva led 
some American literary theorists to push the more reader-friendly 
methods of New Criticism aside; mainstream newspapers like 
the Washington Post and the New York Times began to cover the 
Modern Language Association’s annual meetings; and students 
eager for a practice that was rigorous, theoretically informed, and 
ostensibly engaged in (pseudo) political discourse filled literature 
classrooms in the 1980s and ‘90s. From Derrida’s first lecture in 
the United States—in 1968 at Johns Hopkins University—through 
the end of the twentieth century, the percentage of English majors 
within student populations increased in most 4-year universities 
and liberal arts colleges. While it is notoriously difficult to 
measure social prestige, on the campuses where I taught during 
those decades—Yale, Swarthmore College, Rutgers University, 
Johns Hopkins, and New York University—students of literary 
theory in particular were lords of the manor—at least among 
humanities majors. Arguably, they held their own with social 
science majors as well.
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And then the tide turned. Not all literary scholars were happy with 
the influx of Continental theory, and, during the very decades in 
which the economists reached methodological consensus, the rift 
between Literary Theorists and Custodians of Literature widened 
as methodologies proliferated and the canon was expanded. What 
began as a difference of opinion about how literary works should 
be read (closely and with appreciation, deconstructively and 
with suspicion, as historical actors, as complicit with dominant 
ideologies) gradually morphed into disagreements about what 
teachers of literature should do. Should we teach students to love 
literature? Should we teach them to be critical readers? Should 
we expand the canon so that writings by underrepresented 
populations were included? Should we encourage students to 
resist the patriarchy? With such battles dividing departments of 
literary study, and in a global context transformed by the effects 
of digitalization, a widening gap between the wealthy 1% and 
everyone else, and a job market disrupted by assaults on numerous 
professions, university students understandably turned toward 
disciplines that seemed more obviously aligned with economic 
possibilities. In many universities, the numbers of English 
majors shrank, entire humanities departments were eliminated 
or consolidated (departments of foreign language, Classics), 
and university administrators began to reward departments that 
adopted practices typically associated with the market economy: 
research assessment exercises that measured faculty performance 
by pages published rather than the quality of the scholarship 
(much less teaching); and time-to-degree measures agnostic 
about the quality of a student’s work. With the number of literary 
tuition-paying majors shrinking and an increase in quantitative 
incentives to produce faster, many scholars of literature eager to 
restore our discipline’s prestige have hoped to capitalize—however 
indirectly—on the status economists enjoy. Teaming up with an 
economist on research projects that link the two disciplines is 
one way of demonstrating that literary study can play nicely with 
the market boys. If that isn’t practical, then taking up economic 
themes may be the next best thing.
Of course, there are other reasons for literary scholars to 
address economic issues in our work. For one thing, we might have 
something to add to the way economists currently define value—
that is, in purely quantitative terms. In light of most economists’ 
indifference to social issues such as income inequality, gender 
discrimination, racial prejudice, and climate change, students 
of literature might offer insights that would otherwise not be 
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available. The possibility that literary scholars might have 
something to add to conversations about issues economists 
typically monopolize leads to my second question: why is it so 
difficult for literary scholars to address economic issues in a way 
that would encourage economists to read our work? The short 
answer, as you will already have guessed, is that members of 
the two disciplines speak different languages. Literary scholars 
use some combination of close and “distant” reading, historical 
or contextual placement of texts, and theoretical templates to 
generate new “readings” or interpretations of literary or cultural 
artifacts. Economists use mathematical models to simulate 
some (but not all) of the countless variables visible in economic 
processes and relations. As some economists (such as Dani 
Rodrik) have pointed out, mathematical models are also, in some 
sense, interpretations, but they can be presented more easily 
as “objective” treatments because they rely on the language of 
mathematics. Even historical analysis, which might seem like an 
approach common to literature and economics, is suspect to most 
economists because they consider their discipline to be more like 
a natural science—physics is the most common analogue—than 
a study of conditions that can change over time. If you believe, 
as many economists do, that you are measuring and modeling 
natural forces, such as supply and demand, that have determinate 
relations with each other, you won’t see your enterprise as a 
historically contingent inquiry. Nor will the history of your 
discipline be very interesting except as a litany of approaches that 
fell short of true science.
Of course, some economists do share the interests of literary 
scholars: Deidre McCloskey, for example, has long highlighted 
the roles played in economic analysis by metaphor; and Thomas 
Picketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century contains many 
references to familiar literary texts. These are exceptions, 
however. Pick up any graduate textbook in economics or finance 
currently in use at a major university and you will encounter 
diagrams, equations, and densely composed theoretical 
treatments of topics like the use of stochastic equations to price 
assets, or linear constrained optimization, or optimization under 
uncertainty. For a literary scholar, these texts are very difficult 
to read, and, even if you have the mathematical training and 
can master the vocabulary, it’s almost impossible to develop an 
independent idea about the claims they make. These textbooks 
offer a set of tools to be mastered, not a conversation that is open 
to engagement.
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Even if literary studies and economics do not share a language or 
a set of methodological tools, like all disciplines, they do share 
a reliance on tools that have both theoretical and methodological 
implications. One way literary scholars might go beyond 
addressing economic themes in literary texts is to use our tools 
to investigate economic issues and the claims economists make 
(both about their discipline and about economies more generally). 
I turn now to two examples of how tools developed for literary 
analysis might illuminate important economic issues—albeit not 
in ways all economists would accept.
The tools best suited to this job seem to me to be the genealogical 
analysis popularized by Michel Foucault and deconstruction as it 
has been expanded to interrogate cultural phenomena rather than 
simply literary tropes. What these two methods have in common 
is an ability to highlight the constructedness of phenomena that 
seem, at first glance, simply to be natural objects. Foucault tended 
to use history to reveal the work of cultural construction—madness 
and sexuality have histories that allow us to see the role societies 
have played in making them what they seem naturally to be. 
Deconstructive analysts tend to rely on identifying contradictions 
internal to the syntactic field that makes the object meaningful; 
these contradictions reveal the work necessary to preserve the 
impression of coherence, and they highlight the performative 
potential of semantic fields that seem simply to be meaningful. 
Thus, for example, if one can show that the meanings attributed 
to Hamlet rest on the metaphor of meaninglessness, then one 
can argue that a vacuum generates the character who passes as a 
person. Or, to use a real-world example, if one repeatedly presents 
an individual as a self-made billionaire, as Donald Trump did in 
the 1980s, he may create the conditions in which he will be able 
to actually make large amounts of money, as Trump did with 
his popular television show, The Apprentice, which ran on US 
television for fifteen years. Both genealogy and deconstruction 
enable us to see the social and semantic work necessary to 
create the appearance of inherent or natural meaning. Because 
economists present their own objects of analysis as natural forces 
and their analyses as objective measures of those forces, applying 
our tools to their work allows us to reveal how economists create 
and maintain the appearance of nature—how, for example, 
they have created and maintained central concepts such as the 
“national economy” or the superiority of economic “growth” over 
stability or wealth equality. This, in turn, allows us to identify 
the limitations (and advantages) of economists’ use of models, 
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for models can do what literary critical tools cannot do: they can 
abstract and generalize.
I’m now going to provide a very brief genealogy of the concept 
of a national economy, which is often encapsulated by a single 
number—the Gross Domestic Product, or GDP. Then, using 
deconstruction, I’m going to provide an equally brief analysis of 
derivatives, a financial instrument in which trillions of dollars’ 
worth of value change hands every day. If you want a more detailed 
discussion of the creation of national economies, please read 
chapter 6 of Finance in America: An Unfinished Story, the book 
I published in 2017. If you want a more granular discussion of 
derivatives, see Finance in America, chapters 9 and 10 or Financial 
Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk by Edward LiPuma and 
Benjamin Lee. My remarks are intended to invite you into these 
topics rather than to convey the complexities of our arguments. 
When the Great Depression rocked the global economy in 
1929, economists had no tools with which to assess or measure 
the well-being of a nation’s economy. Even though rulers had long 
depicted the “balance of trade” as a proxy for national health, they 
had no way to make trade imbalances visible; indeed, no reliable 
statistics of national production and consumption existed before 
the 1920s, so it would have been impossible to quantify any 
nation’s economic productivity, much less to present the picture 
of an international balance of trade. A few countries began to 
gather such statistics in the 1920s, but it was not until the 1930s 
that economists were able to depict a national economy as a 
statistical, sectored, calculable entity that could be reduced to a 
single number: the GDP.
As is true with many fundamental concepts of modern 
economics, the “national economy” was forged at the intersection 
of war and taxation. On the one side, for the US, Great Britain, 
and Germany, the ravages of World War I pushed governments 
to quantify their assets: for the victorious Allies, this pressure 
was increased by the domestic problem of oversupply—a problem 
exacerbated by the onset of the Great Depression in 1929; and 
for Germany, the pressure emanated from the US-led Dawes 
Committee’s decision to peg reparations to Germany’s national 
prosperity—that is, its national income. In the US and Great 
Britain, efforts to collect statistics for national income and 
productivity were launched by teams headed by Simon Kuznets 
and Colin Clark under their governments’ direction; and in 
Germany, the Institute for Business Cycle Research, directed by 
Ernst Wagemann, began trying to update the crude estimates that 
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thus far passed as national figures. In the US, the first national 
income report appeared in 1933 and what became the definitive 
model for subsequent reports—the National Income Production 
Account (NIPA)—was first published in 1947. This model was 
improved by the addition of income-output accounts in the 1950s 
and by flow of funds accounts, which were added in the 1960s. 
In 1953, the United Nations adopted the amended NIPA (now the 
System of National Accounts) as the international standard for 
national income accounts. On the other side of this construct, 
taxation mattered because, for the Allied nations, knowing how 
much revenue governments could expect dictated how they could 
budget for rebuilding and then for a second world-wide conflict; 
and for the Germans, who had to borrow from the US to pay the 
demanded reparations, taxation (along with deflation) became the 
burden its citizenry had to bear to mitigate their collective shame.
 In the process of their creation, every stage and facet of 
these accounting methods provoked fierce debate. In the US, the 
first set of national estimates were net estimates (which subtracted 
depreciation, ongoing expenses, and taxes) and they divided 
the national economy into three domestic sectors (households, 
corporations, and government) along with a fourth (“rest of the 
world”). These estimates depicted the economy as a circular flow, 
and they assigned monetary values to the components of these 
flows at the points where income or commodities intersected 
with consumers. Here is Simon Kuznets’s attempt to cut through 
competing theories about how best to measure and value the flows 
of an economy: “In current reality, the most clear-cut, general 
concept of national income is income received by individuals; 
and . . . the uninterrupted flow of commodities and services 
through the economic system is best arrested for the purposes of 
analysis and measurement at the point when the system reaches 
the living individual, after it leaves the productive units proper 
and before it has been diverted into the various channels of 
consumption.”5 When the US Congress asked Milton Gilbert, 
one of Kuznets’s assistants, to revise the latter’s accounting 
estimates in 1941, as America contemplated entering World 
War II, Gilbert rejected nearly every working premise that had 
informed his colleague’s work. In 1941, Gilbert was guided not 
by the problem of oversupply, which was the issue Kuznets had 
to address, but the question of whether the US could redirect 
production from domestic consumption to military spending 
without fueling inflation. In that year, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt had drawn up a war budget that represented half the 
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nation’s output, and he needed to sell his plan to lawmakers and 
a population skeptical about whether the nation could afford to 
go to war. Gilbert shifted the emphasis of his estimates from 
Kuznets’s net measures to gross measurements, and he estimated 
national aggregates by aggregate expenditure, not individuals’ 
consumption. Gilbert argued that gross aggregates provided 
a more appropriate measure for the short-term analysis of war 
spending because some of what net figures subtracted—such as 
business expenses—were actually available to the government to 
help finance the war. Gilbert also decided not to count the interest 
paid on government debt as part of the nation’s income because 
he argued that government debt, which (at that point) was being 
incurred primarily to finance the war, was not analogous to the 
interest corporations paid on their outstanding bonds, which 
constituted a regular cost of doing business. And finally, Gilbert 
imposed on Kuznets’s circular picture of the national economy a 
static organizing structure borrowed from corporate accounting: 
the scaffolding of double-entry bookkeeping. This converted the 
circular flow into a system of inter-related accounts, governed 
by a set of rules known as accounting identities. This, in turn, 
made it easier for the accountant to estimate—or impute—
numerical values for some factors that were not priced by market 
transactions—such as national saving or the government deficit. 
As a result of Gilbert’s reorganization of the national estimates, 
Roosevelt was able to argue that the US economy could support 
its war effort, inflation would not rise, and the US could lead the 
world in creating a reliable measure of national productivity, just 
as it was leading the campaign against Nazi Germany.
While Kuznets and Gilbert vehemently disagreed about 
the details of national accounting, they saw eye to eye on the 
importance of this enterprise. Neither of these accounting 
pioneers, however, acknowledged two related features of the 
picture of the national economy their work created. First, the 
sectors into which both accounting systems divided a nation’s 
economy are fundamentally incommensurate. Unlike households, 
corporations, and even the “rest of the world,” governments are not 
profit-making enterprises. Thus, to apply an accounting system 
devised for the profit-driven corporation to a government requires 
the accountant to treat national income as corporate revenue, 
government consumption as company costs, and the nation’s 
capital formation as profit. Second, and as an extension of this 
incommensurability, equating national growth with the growth 
of a corporation meant equating the nation’s well-being with 
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growth—and, more pointedly, with the growth of the government. 
Going forward, and as an unanticipated effect of the way the 
national accounting system is set up, some economists began to 
argue that the growth of government (its expenditures and costs) is 
a proxy for the growth of the nation itself. This argument, in turn, 
helped support the dramatic increase in taxation that Americans 
saw beginning in 1938, for, in order to grow, a government 
must have revenue. Guided by some of the same principles that 
informed the accounting procedures used to measure the nation’s 
economy, successive US tax plans in the 1940s supported the 
growth of the federal government by beginning to tax not just 
wealthy individuals but every US citizen and by collecting taxes 
from working Americans through payroll withholding rather than 
once a year. Increasing the percentage of American taxpayers 
from 12%, as it had been in 1930, to 90%, as it was in 1945, 
increased the revenue and power of the federal government; and 
payroll withholding allowed the government to calculate its tax 
revenue in advance, budget for future expenditures, and augment 
its own—and the nation’s—present and future power.
This literary-critical genealogy of national accounts reveals 
the historically contingent nature of part of the economic 
fact-making apparatus we now take for granted. Pursued in 
more detail, it could also show how national accounting was 
naturalized—the social process by which national accounting 
shed the arguments that punctuated its history, lost its historical 
contingency, and came to be taken-for-granted. The tool I now 
apply to an economic object focuses not on history but on the 
structure of a financial instrument. My literary-critical tool is 
deconstruction, and the economic object is that array of financial 
assets called derivatives.
A derivative is a contract between two parties whose value 
derives from an underlying asset. Derivatives trading allows 
investment banks, sovereign states, and large-volume traders 
to hedge their risks, as farmers have long been able to do in 
commodities futures markets. Instead of hedging against future 
changes in price, however, as farmers do when they draw up 
futures contracts on their crops, investors use derivatives to 
hedge the risk associated with the ownership of financial assets, 
such as foreign currencies or specified interest rates—whatever 
underlying asset the contract names. In their most exotic form, 
such as credit default swaps, financial derivatives can even allow 
the trader to separate risk from the underlying asset and trade that 
risk in a separate contract.
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As a literary theorist, I can see that the structure of a derivative—
the contract and its underlying asset—replicates the structure of the 
linguistic signifier, as Ferdinand de Saussure described it in the 
early twentieth century. In de Saussure’s account, the signifier—
the word—is separated from what gives it value—its underlying 
signified or meaning. This insight ushered in semiotics, 
structuralism, and deconstruction later in the twentieth century as 
explorations of the ways language generates, but fails to stabilize, 
meaning. That language generates the possibility of meanings 
in excess of the words on the page has allowed generations of 
literary scholars to find new value in texts that have been read 
millions of times. This limitless value is, in a very real sense, the 
currency of literary study: it is what literary scholars have to offer 
our students; it adds immeasurable value to life; the value of the 
literary experience is inexhaustible and incalculable.
Like the linguistic signifier, the financial derivative generates 
value in excess of the originating contract, and, also like the 
signifier, financial derivatives create value from the gap between 
the contract and the underlying asset. In the case of the financial 
derivative, however, the value created is not incalculable. Simple 
derivatives, such as futures, forwards, swaps, and options, 
specify a current price and a future price for the underlying asset. 
The purchaser of the contract can agree to sell, buy, or exchange 
the underlying asset at this price at a specified time in the future; 
the inherent risk is that the future price will depart from the value 
named in the contract. It is this element of risk that both enhances 
the potential monetary value of financial derivatives and can make 
them dangerous—not only to the two contracting parties, but to the 
global financial system as a whole. To see how this danger spread 
throughout the global financial system in the decades between 
1980 and 2008, we need a brief history of financial derivatives.
The financial model and physical institution that allowed 
traders to price and exchange financial derivatives were products 
of the early 1970s. In 1972, Fisher Black, Myron Scholes, and 
Michael C. Jensen published a paper explaining their options 
pricing model; that same year, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
International Money Market opened for trades on currency futures 
(IMM).6 The historical context for the first of these developments 
was the probabilistic revolution that had transformed the academic 
understanding of finance in the 1960s; in this revolution, financial 
theorists began to apply stochastic process techniques (such as 
stochastic calculus) to price financial assets. The historical context 
for the IMM was President Nixon’s abnegation of the Bretton 
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Woods Agreement in 1971; as the value of national currencies 
began to float instead of being tied to gold, it became possible 
for traders to speculate in currency futures and exchange rates. In 
the next three decades, a revolution in information transmission 
(the digital revolution)—which made real-time international 
conferencing and near-instantaneous data transmission and 
trading possible—transformed securities trading and linked 
national financial markets in a single global system. Add to this 
the deregulation of financial markets, which began in 1980, the 
growth of a shadow banking system, which also accelerated 
after 1980, and the passage, in 2000, of the US Commodities 
Futures Modernization Act, and you have the ingredients for 
an explosion in the numbers and kinds of financial derivatives 
products: credit-linked notes, credit default swaps, collateralized 
debt obligations, and collateralized debt obligations squared, to 
name just a few. Many of these financial products are synthetic, 
in the sense that they require no underlying physical asset at all; 
some (structured investment vehicles) are typically not recorded 
on the balance sheet of the entity that originates them; and all are 
traded in the so-called shadow banking system, that network of 
financial institutions that perform the core bank-intermediation 
functions outside the regulated system of official banking. These 
institutions, which are not protected by government insurance 
and which tend to be global, rather than national, in reach, 
include hedge funds, money market funds, finance companies, 
and security broker-dealers who fund their assets with repurchase 
agreements. The monetary value of the financial derivatives 
traded through this network is literally incalculable—not, as with 
literary texts, because we have no metric by which to quantify 
their worth but because the financial records necessary to do so 
are not routinely made public. The best figures I can come up 
with suggest the magnitude of these assets: in 2008, the value of 
worldwide credit derivatives alone was estimated at $62 trillion, 
and in 2011, the worldwide value of outstanding contracts in 
interest rate derivates was estimated at $500 trillion.
In 2008, the global house of cards erected with these financial 
derivatives came crashing down, and we are still living with 
the fallout of that collapse. One could explain the collapse, as 
my co-author and I do in Finance in America, by pointing to the 
maturity mismatch in the shadow banking system: too many 
unregulated financial institutions financed long-term illiquid 
assets with short-term liabilities; and when Americans began 
to default on unaffordable mortgage loans, which constituted 
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the bulk of the long-term illiquid assets, the weak points in the 
global financial system gave way (Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, 
AIG, the national economy of Iceland). Or one could explain 
the collapse by saying that engineered financial assets that lack 
underlying securities—that simply trade risk—inevitably spread 
risk throughout the global financial system, and the only defense 
against collapse would be to impose strict limits on financial 
engineering and the institutions that trade these securities. In 
literary texts, the play that causes the signifier to float free of 
the signified generates limitless opportunities for interpretation; 
but in financial products, the corresponding play can cause risk 
to cascade through a global system of interrelated financial 
institutions, with catastrophic results.
Kevin Brine, who co-authored Finance in America with me, is 
a veteran of Wall Street—a one-time partner in a major brokerage 
firm, whose career spanned the decades in which companies like 
his hired the quants who engineered the products that made a lot 
of money and nearly broke the system. During the ten years we 
worked on the book, Kevin and I had numerous disagreements 
about how to phrase descriptions that touched on the constructed 
nature of the economic principles and financial instruments he 
took for granted throughout his career. When we wrote about the 
creation of national income accounting, for example, I wanted 
to say that national accountants created “what now counts as the 
national economy.” Kevin wanted to say that they created “the 
national economy.” The difference, of course, is that my wording 
emphasizes the social labor inherent in maintaining the effect 
of “the national economy,” whereas his wording allows “the 
national economy” simply to become the natural object most 
readers imagine it to be. In the end, because we wanted to attract 
readers who work on Wall Street, as well as economists—not just 
literary scholars—we most often chose Kevin’s phrases. In other 
words, writing the book, Kevin and I enacted the dispute between 
economists and literary scholars I have been describing in this 
article—with the major caveat that I had the chance to persuade 
him that recognizing the constructed nature of economic and 
financial concepts and tools could enrich our appreciation of these 
things. Most people who trade securities for a living, generate and 
promote economic theories, or advise legislators on economic 
matters have no incentive to view their tools or theories as social 
constructs. And even if they do recognize the social nature of their 
tools, they want to use them to get their jobs done, not admire the 
fictions they contain.
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This brings me to my final point. Analytic tools are created for 
specific tasks. The interpretive tools literary scholars can bring 
to the study of economics and finance are not designed to do the 
work economists and securities traders perform. This is a major 
reason economists and financial theorists see little reason to 
engage in conversations with us. When literary scholars examine 
economic and financial theories, tools, and objects, we do it for the 
conversations we are having with each other, not as contributions 
to solving the problems economists and financial theorists face. 
The models they use cannot do what our analytic tools can do: 
models cannot reveal how social construction works, nor can they 
encourage the play of discriminating interpretation that literary 
theories promote. What models can do is simplify as a basis for 
making generalizations. Such generalizations are useful for 
some kinds of work, just as the literary theorist’s fine-grained 
descriptions are good for other kinds of work. But, as much as 
literary scholars might like to engage economists in genuine two-
way conversations, we need to recognize that, for the most part, 
there is no single set of tools capable of doing the disparate jobs 
our disciplines have historically performed.
Mary Poovey
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